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BEYOND UPJOHN: THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
IN THE CORPORATE CONTEXT
MICHAEL L. WALDMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
The federal courts have experienced great difficulty determining
which employees in a corporation who reveal information to the
corporation's lawyer are entitled to invoke the attorney-client priv-
ilege. In its first attempt at resolving this question, an equally di-
vided Supreme Court merely affirmed the lower court's judgment
without opinion.1 Rathe than settle the differences among the cir-
cuit courts, the Supreme Court left the lower courts to continue
interpreting the proper scope of the attorney-corporate client priv-
ilege without the benefit of the Supreme Court's guidance or
reasoning.2
In 1981, the Supreme Court was more successful. In Upjohn Co.
v. United States,s the Court unanimously rejected the "control
group" test then favored generally in the federal courts.4 The
Court ruled that limiting the privilege to those who control or take
a substantial part in corporate decisions restricted the privilege too
severely. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, reasoned that
the "control group" test hindered corporate attorneys' efforts to
formulate sound legal advice and to ensure their clients' compli-
ance with the law.
* Law clerk to Judge Robert Vance, United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit. J.D., Harvard Law School, 1986; A.B., Harvard University, 1982.
1. Decker v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 400 U.S. 348 (1971) (per curiam), aff'g by an
equally divided Court 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970).
2. "It is impossible to tell whether the four Justices who voted to reverse did so on the
merits or because they believed that the case was an inappropriate one for using the ex-
traordinary writ of mandamus." Sexton, A Post-Upjohn Consideration of the Corporate At-
torney-Client Privilege, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 443, 453 n.38 (1982).
3. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
4. The "control group" test had also been favored during the period when Harper & Row
was before the Court. See Note, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: Culpable Em-
ployees, Attorney Ethics, and the Joint Defense Doctrine, 58 Tm L. REv. 809, 817 (1980);
Sexton, supra note 2, at 451.
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Besides striking down the "control group" test as improperly re-
strictive, however, the Upjohn opinion gave lower courts little
guidance. Over a pointed concurrence from Chief Justice Burger,
the Court explicitly declined to provide any rules or guidelines on
the proper scope of the attorney-corporate client privilege. The
Court again left lower courts to strike their own balance between
the need to discover truth and the desire to preserve adequate le-
gal representation in the corporate context. Since 1981, the lower
courts have granted the privilege to corporate employees on a case-
by-case basis whenever appropriate under "the principles of the
common law as . . . interpreted . . . in light of reason and
experience."6
This Article examines some of the reasons why determining the
proper scope of the attorney-client privilege in the corporate con-
text has proved so nettlesome. Part II traces the historical develop-
ment of the attorney-corporate client privilege in the courts. This
historical analysis focuses on the initial challenges to extending the
privilege to corporations and on the emergence in the 1960s and
early 1970s of the two major tests, the "control group" test and the
"subject matter" test. The development of these different tests
highlights the different justifications for the attorney-client privi-
lege and their applicability to the fiction of the corporate form. In
Part III, a study of the Upjohn opinion explicates the current state
of the case law. Part IV scrutinizes the policy assumptions under-
lying Upjohn and the visions of privilege law and corporations that
Upjohn represents. Building on the theoretical and practical flaws
in Upjohn outlined in Part IV, Part V presents new tests for the
attorney-corporate client privilege. The tests offered in this final
section are both consistent with the traditional purposes of general
privilege law and calculated to overcome the present problems
plaguing the privilege in the corporate context.
5. 449 U.S. at 386 ("We decline to lay down a broad rule or series of rules to govern all
conceivable future questions in this area .. .
6. Id. at 397 (quoting FaD. R. EVID. 501).
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRIVILEGE IN THE CORPORATE
CONTEXT: THE QUESTION PRESENTED
The privilege granted to employee communications with com-
pany lawyers grew out of the law's traditional deference to the at-
torney-client relationship. Wigmore traces the history of the attor-
ney-client privilege "back to the reign of Elizabeth I, where the
privilege already appears as unquestioned."'7 Others have reached
farther back, finding the notion that a lawyer cannot be a witness
against his client deeply rooted in Roman law." The sanctity of
communications between client and attorney has remained firmly
established despite the preeminence since the late eighteenth cen-
tury of "the judicial search for truth" and its demand for every
man's evidence.9 Extension of the privilege to corporate clients,
however, has strained this longstanding tradition. Courts devel-
oped the attorney-client privilege for the individual client. The rise
of the corporate form destroyed the paradigm case of an individual
seeking legal advice and created the problem of identifying the
"client" for purposes of the privilege. 10
The corporate client differs from the individual client in impor-
tant ways. The most obvious but critical difference is that corpora-
tions are inanimate, artificial entities created by the state; they
lack the human qualities-the basic human dignity and
rights-that our legal system recognizes and respects. Secondly,
while attorneys generally can rely on the individual client as the
sole source of information about the case, "the corporate client
may have to summon a vast array of spokesmen-from upper man-
agement to 'blue collar' employees-in order to communicate such
7. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2290, at 542 (McNaughton rev.
ed. 1961) (footnote omitted).
8. C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 87, at 204 (3d ed. 1984).
9. 8 J. WIOMORE, supra note 7, § 2290, at 543.
10. See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977). In Diversified
Industries, the court stated:
A problem arises, however, where the client is a corporation that can communi-
cate or receive communications only by or through its human agents. In such a
case the question arises as to whether the privilege extends to all communica-
tions by or to classes of corporate agents or employees or whether the privilege
is limited to communications by or to only limited classes of such agents or
employees.
Id. at 602.
1987]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
relevant information to counsel."'" This dispersal of information
usually is matched by a dispersal of responsibility. The complexity
of the modern corporation dictates that the tasks of supplying in-
formation, receiving legal advice, and acting on that advice be
spread among a large number of employees at different levels of
the corporation. 2 These fundamental differences serve as grounds
for attacking the extension of a broad privilege to corporate
employees.
A. Radiant Burners: The Privilege Under Attack
Chief Judge Campbell of the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois launched the modern debate over
the scope of the attorney-corporate client privilege in 1962. In Ra-
diant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Association,"3 Judge Camp-
bell "suggest[ed] to the profession and adopt[ed] as the law . . .
that a corporation is not entitled to make claim for the privilege.'
14
Stating that no previous court had decided the issue expressly, he
ruled that letters from corporate officers and employees to the cor-
poration's lawyers were not privileged and must be produced in
discovery.
Judge Campbell isolated two reasons for not extending the attor-
ney-client privilege to corporations. First, "the attorney-client
privilege, analogous to the privilege against self-incrimination, is
historically and fundamentally personal in nature.' 1 5 Campbell
cited Supreme Court cases which had held that the fifth amend-
ment privilege was inherently personal and therefore unavailable
to corporations. 16 He stated that the abhorrence with which the
legal system views forcing individuals to choose between convicting
11. Note, Privileged Communications-Inroads on the "Control Group" Test in the Cor-
porate Area, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 759, 762 (1971).
12. Marketing officials know only selling, plant supervisors understand only production,
and financial departments dominate their specialty. Although each reports to senior man-
agement, much is filtered out through the chain of command. See, e.g., Duplan Corp. v.
Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1164-65 (D.S.C. 1974).
13. 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd on reh'g, 209 F. Supp. 321 (N.D. Ill. 1962), rev'd, 320
F.2d 314 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963).
14. Id. at 773.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 775 (citing United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944); Wilson v. United
States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911)).
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themselves or lying, and forcing lawyers to choose between convict-
ing their clients or lying, loses its force when extended to a corpo-
ration. The moral dilemma and personal anguish which accompany
the disclosure of a client's confidences appear less distressing when
the client is a corporate fiction, "a mere creature of the state and
not a natural entity.' 17
Second, Judge Campbell argued that the lack of confidentiality
intrinsic in the corporate hierarchy would diminish the force of the
privilege. Confidentiality, he noted, is "[o]ne of the fundamental,
universally accepted and most generally stated common law ele-
ments" of any privilege.' This fundamental element of privilege,
Campbell wrote, is incompatible with the natural flow of informa-
tion within a corporation. Officers, directors, supervisory personnel,
office staff, other employees, and shareholders all have access to
files and could possibly "profan[e]" the confidence. 9 Because the
personal relationship and personal confidences of the individual
client and his attorney do not characterize the attorney-corporate
client relationship, a corporation should not be afforded the
privilege.
Judge Campbell's decision, announced by a distinguished jurist
in a huge utilities antitrust case,20 sparked a rash of commentary.'
One can understand the opinion's impact only when the opinion is
considered in light of the long history of unquestioned acceptance
of the privilege. As Judge Campbell noted, "the privilege ha[d]
somewhat generally been taken for granted by the judiciary. '22 In-
deed, prior to Judge Campbell's decision courts made no distinc-
tion between individuals and corporations in applying the attor-
ney-client privilege. The then-prevailing federal test for corporate
officers and employees, enunciated in United States v. United
Shoe Machinery Corp.,23 deviated little from the basic require-
17. Id. at 773.
18. Id. Confidentiality is one of Wigmore's requirements for finding the privilege. See
infra note 24 and accompanying text.
19. 207 F. Supp. at 773-75.
20. The complaint named more than 20 corporate defendants, including divisions of Gen-
eral Electric, General Motors, and Midland-Ross Corp. Id. at 771-72.
21. See Radiant Burners, 320 F.2d 314, 321 n.9 (7th Cir.) (en banc) (citing 15 commenta-
ries on the case published in the brief period prior to the appeals court's ruling).
22. 207 F. Supp. at 772.
23. 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
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ments for the attorney-client privilege that Wigmore delineated.24
The privilege protected information furnished to the attorney by
any officer or employee if furnished in confidence and without the
presence of third persons; the privilege left open only communica-
tions with persons outside the corporate organization.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit au-
thoritatively quashed Judge Campbell's attempt in Radiant Burn-
ers to eliminate the unlimited United Shoe privilege for corporate
employees. Sitting en banc, the circuit court unanimously reversed;
it held that "[a] corporation is entitled to the same treatment as
any other 'client'-no more and no less."'25 The opinion included a
lengthy footnote listing dozens of federal, state, and English cases
dating back to the early nineteenth century in which courts had
applied the attorney-client privilege to corporations.26 The court
described a number of these opinions in greater detail, placing par-
ticular weight on a 1915 Supreme Court decision, United States v.
Louisville & Nashville Railroad,27 which permitted a railroad to
assert the attorney-client privilege. 28 With these cases as back-
ground, the court rejected Judge Campbell's emphasis on the per-
24. Dean Wigmore's widely cited formulation of the rule states that:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal ad-
viser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose,
(4) made in confidence, (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently
protected, (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the
protection be waived.
8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 2292, at 554 (footnote omitted).
The formulation in United Shoe is only slightly different:
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought
to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is
a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with
this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a
fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the pres-
ence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion
on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not
(d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has
been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client.
89 F. Supp. at 358-59; see also Note, supra note 4, at 812 n.12.
25. 320 F.2d 314, 324 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963).
26. Id. at 319 n.7.
27. 236 U.S. 318 (1915).
28. 320 F.2d at 319. As the Seventh Circuit pointed out, however, "[iun that case [Louis-
ville & N.R.R.], the Government did not contest the right of a railroad corporation to invoke
the attorney-client privilege." Id. at 320.
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sonal character of the privilege: "We believe this is a misconcep-
tion of the principle underlying the privilege. Our conclusion is
that the privilege is that of a 'client' without regard to the non-
corporate or corporate character of the client, designed to facilitate
the workings of justice."29
The court focused on utilitarian justifications for the privilege,
stressing that the need to foster attorney effectiveness by encour-
aging full disclosure by clients is essential in both the individual
and corporate contexts. The privilege's benefits-promoting free
and open exchanges between attorney and client-play as neces-
sary a part in the corporate context as they do for the individual
client. The utilitarian justifications for the system, therefore, and
not personal rights, formed the basis for the Seventh Circuit's so-
licitude toward the privilege.30 Although the court acknowledged
that "several noted scholars" such as Dean McCormick and Profes-
sor Morgan had reached a contrary utilitarian balance in the attor-
ney-corporate client area, the Seventh Circuit elected to "follow
Wigmore" in recognizing-and applying the privilege to corporate
employees as well as to individuals."1
Even though Judge Campbell's opinion in Radiant Burners was
overturned on appeal and subsequent courts and legislatures have
shown no inclination to embrace its holding,32 his opinion has had
significant doctrinal consequences. In the short run, Judge Camp-
bell's reexamination of the policies underlying the privilege led
other federal judges to do the same. His incisive refutation of the
confidentiality rationale weakened the justification for the privi-
lege in the corporate context and made courts wary about unthink-
ingly applying the unlimited United Shoe approach. Although re-
jecting his conclusions, courts could not fail to be impressed by
Judge Campbell's reasoning. As one judge stated, for example: "To
29. Id. at 322.
30. The court concluded that "since the privilege does not exist out of deference to any
personal right, but rather because of policy considerations designed to facilitate the work-
ings of justice, it is fully applicable in the broad sense to corporations." Id. at 321 (citations
omitted).
31. Id. at 322-23.
32. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 87, at 207 ("There seems to be little reason to
believe the issue will arise soon again."); see also 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTmIN'S
EVIDENCE 5 503(b)[04] (1980).
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the extent that the learned judge [Campbell] recognizes that appli-
cation of the immunity to the corporation is problematical, I con-
cur. . . .[However,] the proper approach lies in tailoring the ordi-
nary rules to the peculiar cloth of this legal entity."33 Another
judge began a leading case that revised the scope of the privilege
by conceding that "[Judge Campbell's] opinion is supported by a
good deal of history and sound logic, but the availability of the
privilege to corporations has gone unchallenged so long and has
been so generally accepted that I must recognize that it does
exist."34
Campbell's exposure of the difficulties in extending the privilege
thus engendered a new skepticism toward the attorney-client privi-
lege. That courts developed the narrow control group test less than
a year after Judge Campbell's opinion appeared is far from
coincidental.3 5
Judge Campbell's long run doctrinal impact was to head off any
attempt to justify the attorney-corporate client privilege in nonu-
tilitarian terms. Individual autonomy and human dignity, rather
than any beneficial effect on people's behavior or the administra-
tion of justice, underlie most privileges.3 6 Judge Campbell argued
forcefully against the application of these privacy/rights-based jus-
tifications in the corporate context. The moral imperatives against
disclosing intimacies and breaching confidences lack force when
33. American Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 211 F. Supp. 85, 88 n.12 (D. Del.
1962) (Wright, C.J.).
34. City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 484 (E.D. Pa.
1963) (Kirkpatrick, J.).
35. See infra notes 40-51 and accompanying text.
36. The scholarly literature recognizing a privacy/rights-based justification for privilege is
extensive. See, e.g., Krattenmaker, Testimonial Privileges in Federal Courts: An Alterna-
tive to the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEO. L.J. 61 (1973); Saltzburg, Privileges
and Professionals: Lawyers and Psychiatrists, 66 VA. L. REV. 597 (1980). See generally Sex-
ton, supra note 2, at 480 n.133; Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98
HARv. L. REV. 1450, 1480-83 (1985) [hereinafter Privileged Communications]. Notably, the
attorney-client privilege arose out of "the oath and the honor of the attorney," embodying
the notion that a gentleman never revealed confidences. See 8 J. WiGMORE, supra note 7,
§ 2290, at 543. The idea of personal treachery still lingers over violations of the privilege;
yet the origin of privileges is surely a far cry from the utilitarian justification courts rely on
today.
480 [Vol. 28:473
ATTORNEY-CORPORATE CLIENT PRIVILEGE
applied to a monolithic corporation. 7 As one commentator noted,
"the strongest of the nonutilitarian arguments. . . relies upon the
existence of a personal relationship between the lawyer and her cli-
ent and is therefore difficult to advance in relation to a corporate
attorney-client privilege."88 By contrasting the inanimate, artificial
corporation with the "fundamentally personal" nature of the attor-
ney-client privilege, Judge Campbell forced the Seventh Circuit
and future courts to fall back entirely on the Wigmorian utilitarian
rationale."' The total reliance on utilitarian justifications is, in
part, a legacy of Judge Campbell's cogent attack on any privacy/
rights-based justification for the attorney-client privilege in the
corporate context.
B. The Control Group Test: Narrowing the Privilege
The control group test developed in response to Judge Camp-
bell's trenchant analysis of the inapplicability of the attorney-cli-
ent privilege in the corporate setting. Challenged by Campbell's
reasoning, courts were forced to fall back on Wigmore's utilitarian
rationale. Wigmore had described various preconditions for a privi-
lege, stating, among other things, that "the injury that would inure
to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must be
greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of
the litigation, 4 0 and that the privilege must be "strictly confined
within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its
principle[s]. 41 The result of the courts' new interest in Wigmore
was the control group test, first enunciated in City of Philadelphia
37. See Privileged Communications, supra note 36, at 1482; cf. id. at 1482 n.68 ("arguing
that it is difficult to apply noninstrumental arguments to institutions") (citing 23 C. WRIGHT
&K GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5422, at 673 (1980)).
38. Sexton, supra note 2, at 480 n.133 (citing Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral
Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1068-73 (1976)).
39. The leading example of this strictly utilitarian analysis is the Supreme Court's opin-
ion in Upjohn, which is completely devoid of any discussion of privacy interests or any
other non-"systems policy" interest. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
40. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 2285, at 527. For a discussion of Judge Campbell's
influence on the development of the control group test, see Kobak, The Uneven Application
of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Corporations in the Federal Courts, 6 GA. L. REV. 339,
362 (1972).
41. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 2292, at 554. Wigmore stated that the privilege should
be drawn strictly because it obstructs the search for truth and because its benefits are "indi-
rect and speculative." Id.
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v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.42 The test was developed only
months after Judge Campbell's decision, and it quickly gained ac-
ceptance around the country. The control group test enabled
courts to extend the privilege to corporations, albeit in a sharply
circumscribed form.
The control group test rejected the expansive United Shoe ap-
proach of privileging exchanges between any employee and the cor-
poration's lawyers; instead, it required that the communicant be
"in a position to control or even to take a substantial part in a
decision about any action which the corporation may take upon
the advice of the attorney," or that the communicant be a member
of a group having such authority.4s
Courts developed the more limited control group test after ex-
pressing three concerns about a pure Wigmorian cost/benefit anal-
ysis of the attorney-corporate client privilege. The first concern,
relied on explicitly in City of Philadelphia, was that extending the
privilege to statements made by witnesses would be contrary to the
Supreme Court's decision in Hickman v. Taylor.44 According to the
court in City of Philadelphia, Hickman "settle[d] . . . that a
statement given by a witness to a lawyer who is collecting informa-
tion in order to prepare for litigation pending against the lawyer's
client is not privileged. '45 Although Hickman protects attorneys'
mental impressions and free exchanges between clients and law-
yers, it makes clear that the preeminent need for full disclosure
requires that all witnesses furnish relevant and material informa-
tion to the court. To find that all employees are, by virtue of noth-
ing more than their employee status, the "corporate client" would
be to ignore the Supreme Court's teachings in Hickman. Given the
structure of a modern corporation, employees with relevant infor-
mation often more closely resemble accidental, unrelated witnesses
42. 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa.), mandamus denied sub noma. General Elec. Co. v. Kirk-
patrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963).
43. Id. at 485.
44. 329 U.S. 495 (1946).
45. 210 F. Supp. at 485. In Hickman, the Supreme Court held that statements by tug-
boat workers to the tugboat company's lawyers were not privileged. The Court assumed,
however, that the tugboat workers were third party witnesses and never addressed the attor-
ney-corporate client privilege. In addition, the client in Hickman was an individual, not a
corporation. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1946).
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than responsible, informed clients.46 Consequently, City of Phila-
delphia set out a more restrictive test which extended the privilege
only to those "clients" who could act on the attorney's advice
rather than those who merely supplied basic information.
The second and related concern was that corporations would
manipulate an expansive attorney-corporate client privilege so as
to privilege all embarrassing or incriminating documents. Images
abounded of a corporation using the privilege "to funnel its papers
and documents into the hands.of its lawyers ... [to] avoid disclo-
sure" 47 and using its corporate counsel as "the exclusive repository
of unpleasant facts."'48 Unlike an individual, a corporate client
could structure its procedures so as to privilege much of its routine
transactions through transmittal to counsel. As one court noted,
"in the corporate context, given the large number of employees,
frequent dealings with lawyers and masses of documents, the 'zone
of silence grows large.' ,49The control group test met this concern
by ensuring removal of routine intra-corporate communications
from the privilege's protection.
The third concern involved the need for certainty in the identifi-
cation of communications within the privilege's protection. The at-
torney-client privilege is supposed to induce a client to communi-
cate more freely with his or her attorney, thereby promoting more
effective legal representation.5 0 An uncertain privilege, however,
will inhibit communications because clients will fear the eventual
public disclosure of their conversations. A proper application of
the privilege, therefore, requires a bright line in order to reassure
attorneys and corporate managers of the secrecy of their communi-
cations. Proponents of the control group test believed it to be such
a bright line, lauding it for its "predictability and ease of applica-
46. 210 F. Supp. at 485; see also Sexton, supra note 2, at 451.
47. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 324 (7th Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963).
48. United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1227 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 383
(1981); see also Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 692 (10th Cir. 1968).
49. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 89 Ill. 2d 103, 118, 432 N.E.2d 250, 257
(1982) (citation omitted).
50. See Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Fixed Rules, Balancing and Constitutional
Entitlement, 91 HARV. L. REv. 464, 468 (1977) [hereinafter Note, Attorney-Client Privilege];
Note, Attorney-Client Privilege for Corporate Clients: The Control Group Test, 84 HARv.
L. RE v. 424, 426 (1970) [hereinafter Note, The Control Group Test].
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tion.''51 By limiting the privilege to the small group of senior man-
agers who control decision making, the control group test allowed
corporations to identify easily who could speak as the client.
C. The Subject Matter Test: The Need for Effective Advice
Until 1970, the control group test reigned supreme; all federal
courts utilized the test, and the drafters recommended it in their
original proposals for the Federal Rules of Evidence.5 2 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit first challenged
this dominance in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker53 by
adopting a broader test for determining the scope of the attorney-
corporate client privilege. In Harper & Row, the court focused on
the subject matter of the employee's communications rather than
on the nature of the employee who was communicating the infor-
mation. Under this "subject matter" test, an employee's
communication to the corporation's attorney is privileged where
the employee makes the communication at the direction of his
superiors in the corporation and where the subject matter upon
which the attorney's advice is sought by the corporation and
dealt with in the communication is the performance by the em-
ployee of the duties of his employment."
Although the court's per curiam opinion was somewhat short on
explanation, the reasoning behind a broader privilege was readily
apparent. Opponents of the control group test argued that only by
extending the privilege to low-level employees could attorneys ad-
vise their corporate clients adequately. To restrict the privilege to
communications of top-level executives was to ignore "the realities
of corporate life"'5 5 because control group members often lack the
51. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co, 89 Ill. 2d 103, 118, 432 N.E.2d 250, 257
(1982); see also infra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
52. See 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 32, 1 503(b)[04], at 503-47; Sexton,
supra note 2, at 453 n.38.
53. 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970) (per curiam), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 400 U.S.
348 (1971); see supra note 1 and accompanying text.
54. 423 F.2d at 491-92.
55. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 608 (8th Cir. 1977) (en banc). As
one court noted:
[T]aking a common sense look at the practicalities of the "control group" test
and its applicability in the day-to-day workings of a lawyer, it is obvious that
[Vol. 28:473
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information needed by attorneys to formulate sound legal advice.
Because the critical flow of. information often begins with the low-
level employees who actually possess the hard facts, the control
group test inhibited attorney communications with these knowl-
edgeable employees. Under the control group test, an attorney
is thus faced with a "Hobson's choice." If he interviews employ-
ees not having "the very highest authority," their communica-
tions to him will not be privileged. If, on the other hand, he in-
terviews only those with "the very highest authority," he may
find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine what
actually transpired.56
The more expansive subject matter test was designed to avoid
these dilemmas. The subject matter test as expounded by Harper
& Row extends the privilege to all information employees convey,
with the exception of information obtained "almost fortuitously"
and not related to their on-the-job activity.5 7 The test's emphasis
on ensuring effective legal advice won many adherents. After an
equally divided Supreme Court summarily affirmed Harper &
Row,"s the drafters removed the control group test from the pro-
posed rules and left further development in the corporate client
privilege area to the case law.59
Federal courts in the 1970s usually adopted one of the two es-
tablished tests, although some attempted variations or syntheses of
these tests. For example, in Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken,
Inc.,60 a district court held that communications must meet both
the control group and subject matter tests in order to be privi-
... [a corporation] cannot deal solely through the chairman of the board of
directors. There has to be a sufficient number of persons within a corporation
who are authorized on behalf of the corporation to seek advice, to give infor-
mation with respect to the rendition of advice and to receive advice.
Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1164 (D.S.C. 1975).
56. Weinschel, Corporate Employee Interviews and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 12
B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REv. 873, 876 (1971).
57. 423 F.2d at 491. This exemption for "fortuitous" witnesses is probably an attempt to
reconcile the case with Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). These "fortuitous" wit-
nesses are analogous to the tugboat employees in Hickman.
58. 400 U.S. 348 (1971).
59. For a discussion of the aftermath of Harper & Row, see J. WEINSTEIN & X. BERGER,
supra note 32, % 503(b)[04], at 503-47.
60. 397 F. Supp. 1146 (D.S.C. 1974).
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leged 1 In In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation,2 another district
court attempted to modify the breadth of the Harper & Row test.
The fear that the privilege would extend to routine reports and
everyday exchanges led this district court to "focus on the relation-
ship between the subject matter of the particular communication
and the decisionmaking process regarding the corporation's legal
problem. '86 The privilege attached only if, among other things, the
"communication of information. . was reasonably believed to be
necessary to the decision-making process concerning a problem on
which legal advice was sought. '84
The best known variation on the subject matter test appeared in
Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith.5 In that case, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit modified the subject
matter test along the lines suggested by Judge Weinstein in his
treatise on evidence.6 In addition to requiring that the communi-
cation be made at the direction of superiors and that it cover infor-
mation within the employee's duties, the court in Diversified In-
dustries required that the communication be made for the purpose
of obtaining legal services for the corporation and that it be kept
confidential within the corporation. The court reasoned that
these further requirements would restrict the privilege to legiti-
mate attorney-client exchanges, rather than ordinary business
61. Id. at 1165 (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491-92 (7th
Cir. 1970) (per curiam), aff'd by an equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971)); see also
Sexton, supra note 2, at 454.
62. 81 F.R.D. 377 (D.D.C. 1978).
63. Sexton, supra note 2, at 455.
64. 81 F.R.D. at 385.
65. 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977) (en banc), aff'd on reh'g, 572 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1978).
66. See 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 32, T 503(b)[04], at 503-47 to -50. The
court extended the privilege where:
(1) the communication was made for the purpose of securing legal advice; (2)
the employee making the communication did so at the direction of his corpo-
rate superior; (3) the superior made the request so that the corporation could
secure legal advice; (4) the subject matter of the communication is within the
scope of the employee's corporate duties; and (5) the communication is not
disseminated beyond those persons who, because of the corporate structure,
need to know its contents.
572 F.2d at 609. Many commentators see this variation as merely a gloss on the Wigmorian
rules already incorporated into the control group test. See, e.g., Consolidation Coal Co. v.
Bucyrus-Erie Co., 89 Ill. 2d 103, 432 N.E.2d 250 (1982); Sexton, supra note 2, at 455 n.49.
67. 572 F.2d at 609.
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records. Under the Diversified Industries test, the mere receipt of
routine reports by corporate counsel would not make the commu-
nication privileged because such routine communications ordina-
rily are available widely and are not made for the purpose of secur-
ing legal advice. These modifications would "substantially limit
whatever potential for abuse the Harper & Row [subject matter]
test presents"68 and would "better protect the purpose underlying
the attorney-client privilege." 9 Some courts in the late 1970s
nonetheless continued to view the control group test as "the rule
most likely to obtain the greatest discovery, the rule more easily
applied by the Court. . .the rule more likely to be recognized as
reasonable by the parties, and the rule most consonant with the
purposes of the attorney-client privilege." 70
III. Upjohn Co. v. United States: THE SUPREME COURT SPEAKS
Upjohn Co. v. United States presented the Supreme Court with
an archetypical set of facts.71 In 1976, auditors alerted Upjohn to
the possibility that certain of its subsidiaries were making im-
proper payments to foreign government officials. Because of a
heightened awareness in the post-Watergate era of the problems
posed by secret domestic political contributions, corporate payoffs
to foreign officials, and commercial bribery, Upjohn's general coun-
sel launched an internal investigation. Corporate counsel sent out
confidential questionnaires and conducted interviews with "all for-
eign general and area managers" as well as more than thirty other
members of senior management. 2
68. Id. (citation omitted).
69. Id.
70. Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 68 F.R.D. 397, 400
(E.D. Va. 1975); see In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1979); United
States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd and remanded, 449 U.S. 383
(1981); cf. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 89 IlM. 2d 103, 118, 432 N.E.2d 250,
257 (1982) (electing to adopt control group test for Illinois state law even after Upjohn).
71. 449 U.S. 383 (1981). Upjohn, like Diversified Industries, involved a report rendered
by a law firm engaged to investigate whether corporate employees had been bribing
purchasing agents with which the corporation dealt. Id. at 386-87; 572 F.2d at 600-01.
72. 449 U.S. at 386-87. Corporate counsel interviewed 86 employees. Id. at 394 n.3.
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When the company voluntarily disclosed certain questionable
payments to the Securities and Exchange Commission, 73 the Inter-
nal Revenue Service issued a summons for the production of all
documents gathered during Upjohn's internal investigation.
Upjohn offered to make all of its officials available for interroga-
tion but declined to produce the questionnaires and interview
notes, claiming that the attorney-client privilege and attorney
work product immunity protected the documents. The district
court enforced the summons, and the company appealed. 4
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit af-
firmed the district court's order of production. In its opinion, the
court propounded a classic defense of the control group test. The
court first pointed out the problematic nature of extending to a
corporation a privilege based partly on the "privacy" and "loyalty"
of the "intimate relationship" between an individual and his law-
yer. 5 The court also questioned the efficacy of the subject matter
test, worrying that the corporate counsel would become "the exclu-
sive repository of unpleasant facts" 76 and that "corporate manag-
ers [would] shield themselves from information about possibly ille-
gal transactions. 7 7 The court finally noted the severe burden that
the questioning of large numbers of foreign citizens would entail
for the IRS. 8 Concluding that the subject matter test would inflict
significant costs on the IRS investigation and create the potential
for a broad "zone of silence," the court applied the narrower con-
trol group test. The court ruled that the communications by
Upjohn employees could not meet this stricter test.79 Upjohn again
appealed.
73. Id. at 387. The company's disclosures appeared to be motivated by an SEC policy
which promised more lenient treatment for companies that voluntarily disclosed violations.
This SEC policy, and recent court opinions finding such voluntary reports to constitute a
waiver for all purposes, may have a dramatic impact on corporations' use of the attorney-
client privilege in the future. See, e.g., In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367 (D.C.
Cir. 1984); In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1982); In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d
482 (2d Cir. 1982). See generally Privileged Communications, supra note 36, at 1650-59.
74. 449 U.S. at 386-89.
75. 600 F.2d 1223, 1226-27 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd and remanded, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
76. Id. at 1227.
77. Id. at 1225.
78. Id. at 1227.
79. Id. The court disposed of Upjohn's work product claim by finding the doctrine inap-
plicable to an Internal Revenue Service administrative summons. Id. at 1224.
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Although Upjohn presented the Supreme Court with the same
question that had deadlocked the Court a decade earlier and that
had inspired a vociferous debate among the lower courts, the Court
appeared to have little trouble reversing the Sixth Circuit. The
Court unanimously and emphatically rejected the control group
test, needing only eight pages of Justice Rehnquist's majority opin-
ion to explain its position. 0
In the first part of the opinion, Justice Rehnquist established
the purpose of the privilege: "to encourage full and frank commu-
nication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote
broader public interests in the observance of law and administra-
tion of justice."81 The Court cited privilege cases dating from 1888
to support its proposition that the historical justification for the
attorney-client privilege had been to promote justice by encourag-
ing full disclosure.8 2 The Court concluded that this reasoning ap-
plied equally when the client is a corporation. 3
Next, the Court held that the control group test failed to further
the original aims of the attorney-client privilege. The Court ex-
plained that the control group test's emphasis on the employee's
ability to act on legal advice from the counsel did not provide
enough protection to encourage a flow of information to the law-
yer.8 4 By restricting the privilege to a small group within the cor-
poration, the control group test inhibited the flow of important in-
formation to the attorney. The Court opined that "[m]iddle-
level-and indeed lower level-employees . ..have the relevant
information needed by corporate counsel if he is adequately to ad-
vise the client with respect to such actual or potential [legal] diffi-
culties."' 5 Without the vital facts possessed by noncontrol group
employees, the corporation would be deprived of effective legal ad-
vice concerning "the vast and complicated array of regulatory leg-
islation confronting [it]." 8
80. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
81. Id. at 389.
82. Id. (citing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980); Hunt v. Blackburn, 128
U.S. 464, 470 (1888)).
83. Id. at 390.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 391.
86. Id. at 392.
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The Court also criticized the control group test's "Hobson's
choice" of either interviewing noncontrol group employees without
the protection of the attorney-client privilege or not interviewing
such employees and thus giving advice with only a partial under-
standing of the facts.87 Justice Rehnquist pointed out that even if
the attorney could formulate a legal opinion without talking to
low-level employees, "the control group test ma[de] it more diffi-
cult to convey full and frank legal advice" to the lower level em-
ployees who would put the policy into effect.8 The Court also criti-
cized the control group test for its unpredictability. Noting that
some degree of certainty is essential to encourage the free flow of
information that the attorney-client privilege prizes, the Court
stated that "[d]isparate decisions in cases applying [the control
group] test illustrate its unpredictability."89
The final part of the Court's analysis applied the principles of
the privilege to the facts in the case. The Court restated what it
considered to be the salient facts: the communications were made
by Upjohn employees to counsel at the direction of corporate
superiors; Upjohn needed the communications as a basis for legal
advice; the employees, because of a letter from an Upjohn senior
manager, were "sufficiently aware" that they were being ques-
tioned so that the corporation could receive legal advice; the com-
munications concerned matters within the scope of the employees'
duties; and Upjohn kept the communications "highly confiden-
tial. ' '90 Given these facts, the Court concluded that protecting the
communications was "[c]onsistent with the underlying purposes of
the attorney-client privilege." 91
Lest lower courts read his opinion as implicitly embracing the
modified subject matter test of Diversified Industries,92 Justice
87. Id. at 391-92 (citing Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 608-09 (8th Cir.
1978) (en banc)); see supra note 56 and accompanying text.
88. 449 U.S. at 392.
89. Id. (comparing Hogan v. Zletz, 43 F.R.D. 308, 315-16 (N.D. Okla. 1967), aff'd in part
sub noma. Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968), with Congoleum Indus., Inc. v.
GAF Corp., 49 F.R.D. 82, 83-85 (E.D. Pa. 1969), afl'd, 478 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1973)).
90. Id. at 394-95.
91. Id. at 395.
92. See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, a number of commenta-
tors have noted that the Supreme Court referred to Diversified Industries frequently in the
opinion and that the facts emphasized by the Court parallel some of the criteria of the
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Rehnquist emphasized that the Court was deciding one case only.
The Court explicitly and repeatedly disavowed any attempt to pro-
mulgate rules or guidelines93 and never even mentioned the subject
matter test by name. Although Chief Justice Burger urged the
Court to adopt a modified subject matter test,94 and despite the
test's place in the federal courts as the chief alternative to the con-
trol group test, the Court was content to hold that the control
group test was too narrow to govern the development of the law of
attorney-corporate client privilege. The Court left such future de-
velopment to the wisdom of the lower courts, applying the princi-
ples of the common law.95
IV. Upjohn Co. v. United States: THE SOUNDS OF SILENCE
After the epic battles fought in courtrooms and law reviews for
almost twenty years, the Supreme Court's decision in Upjohn
seemed almost anticlimatic. The opinion's conclusory tone and the
Court's refusal to set out any definitive guidelines exacerbated this
disappointment. Justice Rehnquist's discussion of the issue, meet-
ing no dissent, was striking for its cursory treatment of the con-
cerns of the lower courts and commentators.9 This section dis-
cusses some of the important issues that the Supreme Court
brushed aside in its rush to invalidate the control group test.
First, the Supreme Court failed to address the legacy of Judge
Campbell's Radiant Burners opinion. Although the circuit court's
opinion in Upjohn had noted that the "privacy" and "intimate re-
lationship" rationale underlying the attorney-client privilege was
Diversified Industries modified test. See, e.g., J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 32,
503(b)[04], at 503-54; Sexton, supra note 2, at 461; Note, Attorney-Client Privilege, 19 AM.
CraM. L. REv. 251, 257 (1981); Note, The Implications of Upjohn, 56 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
887, 892-94 (1981).
93. See supra note 5. "[T]o draft a set of rules ... [to] govern challenges to investigatory
subpoenas ... would violate the spirit of Federal Rule of Evidence 501." 449 U.S. at 396.
94. Id. at 403 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
95. Id. at 397. The Court also took an expansive view of the attorney work-product doc-
trine, requiring a stronger showing of necessity than that provided by the government and
assuming that preliminary investigations such as Upjohn's were in anticipation of litigation.
See id. at 397-402.
96. See Sexton, supra note 2, at 444 (describing Upjohn as "an opinion largely character-
ized by unexplicated conclusory language").
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problematic when applied to corporations,97 the Supreme Court
did not confront this threshold question. The Court made no at-
tempt to justify its primary assumption that the attorney-client
privilege should apply in the corporate context, but merely stated:
Admittedly complications in the application of the privilege
arise when the client is a corporation, which in theory is an arti-
ficial creature of the law, and not an individual; but this Court
has assumed that the privilege applies when the client is a cor-
poration, . . . and the Government does not contest the general
proposition."
Such cavalier treatment was unfortunate. A privacy/rights-based
rationale historically has played an important role in justifying the
attorney-client privilege. As Judge Campbell pointed out in Radi-
ant Burners, the inapplicability of this rationale to the corporate
context has significant implications."9 The Supreme Court had an
obligation to confront these implications. 100
To the extent that the Court offered an explanation for its will-
ingness to extend the protection of the attorney-client privilege to
corporations, it relied on a "voluntary compliance" model. 10' This
model rested on the premise that a free flow of communications
between corporate employees and attorneys would promote volun-
tary compliance with the law. The attorney, if given all relevant
information, could inform corporate officers of their legal duties;
these corporate officers, as law-abiding citizens, then would con-
form their behavior to their legal obligations. 102 This model led the
97. 600 F.2d 1223, 1226-27 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
98. 449 U.S. at 389-90 (citation omitted).
99. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
100. One student commentator hypothesized that the Court may have suffered from the
lack of true adversaries on this issue. The government may have been unwilling to argue
that the privilege did not apply to corporations because this contention might have under-
mined the government's own institutional privilege. The Supreme Court 1980 Term, 95
HARv. L. REV. 91, 273 n.20 (1981) [hereinafter Note, 1980 Term].
101. For a more detailed discussion of the "voluntary compliance" model, see Sexton,
supra note 2, at 463-73; see also infra note 111 and accompanying text.
102.
[T]he nature of an attorney as an arm of law enforcement lends support to the
legitimacy of the corporate need for legal counsel. The probability of bringing
corporations into compliance with the law is enhanced by the greater access of
corporations to counsel resulting from the availability of the privilege. There-
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Court in Upjohn to bestow preeminent value upon fostering the
flow of information between corporate clients and their attorneys.
This justification seemed particularly suited to the facts in
Upjohn, where the corporation aimed its investigation at achieving
compliance with SEC and other federal regulations. Unfortunately,
the Court never considered the darker side of corporate behavior.
The Court singlemindedly concentrated on the benefits of the priv-
ilege and ignored the accompanying costs. For a decision based on
the utilitarian cost/benefit balancing approach, this was a funda-
mental flaw.103
By focusing on the benefits of the privilege, the Court missed the
special costs inherent in applying the privilege to corporations.
One such ignored cost is that the corporation is more likely than
an individual client to manipulate the privilege to conceal informa-
tion used for nonlegal purposes.'0 4 The division of corporate re-
sponsibility that requires attorneys to go beyond the control group
for vital information also requires the control group to look to
lower levels in order to formulate business decisions. Employing
lawyers to serve as the conduits keeps the information secret from
potential legal adversaries while allowing management to take the
necessary business actions. As communications move through the
informational and decision-making structure, the motives for the
fore, corporations need effective legal counsel, perhaps even more than do indi-
vidual clients, to advise them in their varied and complex array of activities.
Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Corporation in Shareholder Litigation, 50 S.
CAL. L. REv. 303, 309 (1977) (footnotes omitted).
103. The Court did not even make a pretense of using the privacy rationale, but relied
solely on the Wigmorian utilitarian rationale. See 449 U.S. at 389-90. The Court examined
the costs of the privilege only once, however, stating that the privilege placed the adversary
in "no worse position than if the communications had never taken place." Id. at 395. The
Court went on to note that the privilege did not protect the underlying facts communicated
by the client and that "[d]iscovery was hardly intended to enable a learned profession to
perform its functions ... on wits borrowed from the adversary." Id. at 396 (citation omit-
ted). This scanty reasoning does not answer adequately the questions raised concerning the
costs of the attorney-client privilege in the corporate context.
104. An individual also may manipulate the privilege for nonlegal purposes. Courts deny
the privilege's protection when lawyers are giving business advice, rather than legal counsel,
or when they conspire in criminal activity. The corporate context is qualitatively different,
however, because it is by nature a business situation, lawyers often are tied intimately to the
business side, and the structural setting requires movement of information among decision
makers within the corporation. These additional characteristics of corporations create an
enormous potential for abuse of the privilege.
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communications can be mixed: the company may want its lawyers
to gather information to aid in the preparation of legal advice,
while it needs the information collected for more general business
purposes. An expansive attorney-corporate client privilege may en-
courage corporations to conduct legal investigations into the de-
tails of any potentially embarrassing incident, not as a result of
legal need, but because of the secrecy the privilege provides to bus-
iness decisions.
The subject matter test, especially as modified by Diversified In-
dustries,105 theoretically should exclude from the privilege all com-
munications made for the purpose of obtaining nonlegal advice. In
practice, however, courts are unable to discern whether the law-
yer's role was solely, predominantly, or marginally for legal pur-
poses. The pervasive involvement of in-house and regular counsel
in corporate affairs makes such a distinction difficult to perceive;
lawyers are involved intimately with company management and
operations. 106 The ease with which potential legal questions can be
imaginatively created after the fact makes claims of legal purpose
nearly unimpeachable. Every transaction from personnel changes
to corporate contracts has some possible legal ramification.107 An
105. See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
106. See 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 32, 503(b)[04], at 503-43 ("In the case
of corporations,. . . particularly when house counsel is involved, the boundary between le-
gal advice and business advice grows too dim for the privilege to apply."); Sexton, supra
note 2, at 493 n.158 ("determining whether an attorney is acting in a legal or nonlegal capac-
ity is quite difficult, and . . . turns on fine distinctions"); Note, Attorney-Client Privilege,
supra note 50, at 473 n.37 (emphasizing "problematic status of in-house counsel").
107. This constant connection between the corporation and its legal counsel also can
mean that the attorney-corporate client privilege is not justified as an inducement to pro-
mote attorney-client communication. Many observers assert that corporations will under-
take investigations and seek advice whether or not the investigations or communications are
privileged. As one writer put it, "[I]nvestigations would continue even in the absence of the
privilege-although they might be performed by someone other than the attorney-because
corporate management needs the information to correct past inefficiencies, to reward and
reprimand employees, and to file appropriate governmental documents." Note, 1980 Term,
supra note 100, at 277; see also Note, Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 50, at 473-74.
The Third Circuit stated similarly that a "corporation would [not] risk civil or criminal
liability . . . by foregoing introspection. In our opinion, the potential costs of undetected
noncompliance are themselves high enough to ensure that corporate officials will authorize
investigations regardless of an inability to keep such investigations completely confidential."
In re Grand Jury, 599 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1979). Faced with treble damages for anti-
trust violations, extensive state and federal reporting requirements, and the legal demands
of loan underwriters and proxy statements, corporations may have no choice but to commu-
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expansive attorney-corporate client privilege thus might enable
corporate management to institute needed business measures in
secret, allow company lawyers to collect lucrative fees for their "le-
gal" investigations, and force any eventual government or civil in-
vestigators to probe the slippery memories of any available em-
ployees they might discover.
The Court in Upjohn also ignored the special obstacles that the
modern corporation poses to information gathering. Although the
Court held that the privilege does not protect underlying facts,10 8
this concession provides cold comfort to litigants confronted with
the byzantine, multilayered structure of many corporations. The
Court itself recognized this dilemma in an earlier case, and refused
to extend the fifth amendment to corporations:
The greater portion of evidence of wrongdoing by an organiza-
tion or its representatives is usually to be found in the official
records and documents of that organization. Were the cloak of
the privilege to be thrown around these impersonal records and
documents, effective enforcement of many federal and state laws
would be impossible. 09
A litigant generally may discover information from an individual
opponent as easily as from the opponent's attorney, but the corpo-
rate lawyer may serve as a nerve center for corporate information
gathered from many sources, often from around the world. With-
out access to the corporate attorney's reports, an adversary must
nicate with their attorneys-making the benefits of the privilege more illusory than Upjohn
contemplates.
Whether investigations would take place in the absence of the attorney-corporate client
privilege is one of the great imponderables surrounding the privilege. The Court in Upjohn
dealt with this issue in a footnote. The Court argued that the notion that corporations
would conduct investigations and seek legal advice even without a privilege "ignores the fact
that the depth and quality of any investigations, to ensure compliance with the law would
suffer, even were they undertaken." 449 U.S. at 393 n.2. The Court also noted that such an
argument "proves too much, since it applies to all communications covered by the privilege:
an individual trying to comply with the law or faced with a legal problem also has strong
incentive to disclose information to his lawyer, yet the common law has recognized the value
of the privilege in further facilitating communications." Id. With these conclusory state-
ments, the Court sidestepped the issue of whether the special characteristics of corporations
limit the additional communication the privilege induces to such a degree that the privi-
lege's costs outweigh its benefits.
108. 449 U.S. at 395.
109. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 700 (1944).
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attempt to track down this widely dispersed information. Such
tracking is a costly, difficult, and, especially if done years later
when memories have faded or conformed, often fruitless task. Not
only may the privilege force an adversary to duplicate the ques-
tioning of vast numbers of individuals scattered around the coun-
try or world, but it also may prevent the best evidence from ever
coming to light. The "paper trail" can provide the most effective
means of understanding and attacking a corporate action. As dis-
cussed earlier, however, the "paper trail" can be funnelled through
an attorney and structured to fit the mold of an expansive attor-
ney-corporate client privilege. With these contemporaneous
records enveloped in "the zone of silence," the corporation may
frequently prove a black hole from which no incriminating infor-
mation will escape.110
The Supreme Court's opinion in Upjohn also neglected the costs
of allowing some measure of corporate misconduct to go unpun-
ished. The Court envisioned voluntary compliance with govern-
ment regulation, but much regulation of business is still founded
upon the threat of judicial and administrative penalties.111 The
IRS, for example, was unwilling to accept the voluntary disclosures
of Upjohn and demanded further information on the corporation's
activities. An expansive corporate client privilege can hamper ef-
fective law enforcement to an extent which outweighs the benefits
of voluntary compliance. Nevertheless, after Upjohn, government
agencies and prosecutors are limited in the information available
to them in the discovery and prosecution of criminal behavior; the
110. For example, Upjohn involved hundreds of written questionnaire responses and 86
interviews with employees. The probe investigated payments to officials in many of the 136
foreign countries in which Upjohn did business. 600 F.2d at 1225. In another major case, the
SEC would have been forced to duplicate an internal probe which received questionnaires
from 1,877 managerial employees. See In re Grand Jury, 599 F.2d 1224, 1227 (3d Cir. 1979);
see also Sexton, supra note 2, at 477 (If privilege protects the paper trail, no "effective
alternative source of proof' may exist.); Note, Evidence: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 551, 563 (1963) (ad-
versaries would be stymied if corporation could protect "paper trail").
111. See Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior
Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1229 (1979) ("[I]n areas ranging from
tax, securities and antitrust to the newer fields of environmental control, safety regulation,
and the prevention of 'corrupt practices,' the federal government has come to rely more and
more on the deterrent effect of criminal punishment to shape corporate action."); see also
Note, supra note 4, at 809 n.1; cf. Sexton, supra note 2, at 469 n.107.
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Supreme Court has determined that the voluntary compliance
model is more efficacious than deterrent enforcement. The empiri-
cal data or logical basis for this decision remains illusive, however.
The Court's attitude toward unpunished corporate misconduct
likely was influenced by its perception of the nature of these mis-
deeds.'12 In the years immediately preceding Upjohn, the corpo-
rate activities under review were the post-Watergate problems of
foreign payoffs and illegal campaign contributions. The Court un-
derstandably found such activities troubling but not of sufficient
magnitude to justify restricting the traditionally protected activi-
ties of lawyers. Areas of corporate misconduct today appear quali-
tatively different, however. Today's corporate misdeeds-financial
institutions laundering money for organized crime, fraudulent se-
curities schemes on a huge scale, massive overcharges by defense
contractors, and illegal handling and dumping of toxic materi-
als-inflict a much higher cost on society.113 The Upjohn opinion's
broad corporate privilege reflects an inadequate consideration of
the potential for a new view of corporate criminality, which should
lead to a greater stress on enforcement and a more restrictive
privilege.
Finally, commentators have criticized Upjohn for its failure to
provide the certainty needed to achieve the purposes of the privi-
112. The cost-benefit calculus looks to the magnitude of the cost discounted by its
probability. Thus, the costs will weigh more heavily against the privilege in instances of vile
and heinous crimes with high social costs, rather than in instances of misdemeanors or vic-
timless crimes. See Privileged Communications, supra note 36, at 1507-08.
113. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1986, at D9, col. 3 (Bank of New England fined $1.24
million for criminal violations of currency laws); Bus. Wm, Sept. 9, 1985, at 31 (fourteen
bankers arrested at numerous Puerto Rican banks for laundering narcotics money); N.Y.
Times, Feb. 8, 1985, at Al, col. 5 (Bank of Boston fined $500,000 for failure to report $1.2
billion in overseas cash transfers); N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1985, at 42, col. 1 (three officials of
failed Ohio Bank, including owner, indicted on more than 45 counts of fraud, theft, and
securities violations); Boston Globe, Apr. 23, 1985, at 43, col. 1 (bank fraud left FDIC with
$600 million in uncollectable loans); N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1985, at D4, col. 1 (investment
firm pleads guilty to 2,000 counts of wire and mail fraud); Wash. Post, June 20, 1985, at
A17, col. 1 (nine of nation's 10 largest defense contractors investigated for bribery, kick-
backs, and false claims); NawSWaEK, Aug. 26, 1985, at 21 (defense contractor involved in
foreign bribes and fraudulent overcharges). See generally FORTUNE, July 22, 1985, at 90
(describing scope and range of white collar crime); Bus. WK., Mar. 18, 1985, at 74 (describ-
ing complicity of banks and legitimate enterprises in money laundering schemes); N.Y.
Times, Mar. 12, 1985, at A24, col. 3 (citing criticism of "renegade attorneys" who provide
illegal support for criminal organizations).
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lege. The Court brought much of this criticism upon itself by an
internal inconsistency in its opinion. In arguing that the control
group test is inadequate due to its unpredictability, Justice Rehn-
quist stated:
[I]f the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to be served,
the attorney and client must be able to predict with some degree
of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected. An
uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but re-
sults in widely varying applications by the Courts, is little better
than no privilege at all.",4
In spite of this strong affirmation of the need for certainty,
Upjohn failed to set forth any test or standard to guide corpora-
tions, attorneys, and courts. Instead, the Court left the develop-
ment of the privilege to the vagaries of the common law, which
inevitably will lead to "widely varying applications by the courts"
which is "little better than no privilege at all."'115 Even Justice
Rehnquist conceded that the case-by-case approach might "to
some slight extent undermine desirable certainty."'11 6 In a concur-
rence which urged that the Court adopt a uniform standard, Chief
Justice Burger noted sardonically that Justice Rehnquist's conces-
sion "neither minimizes the consequences of continuing uncer-
tainty and confusion nor harmonizes the inherent dissonance of ac-
knowledging that uncertainty while declining to clarify it within
the frame of issues presented." 117
The Court's criticism of the control group test as inherently un-
certain and unpredictable also is highly suspect. The Upjohn opin-
ion first stated its conclusion that "the very terms of the [control
group] test suggest the unpredictability of its application." 118 To
114. 449 U.S. at 393.
115. See Sexton, supra note 2, at 471 ("By declining to promulgate a broad rule ... the
Justices adopted a course that arguably will occasion unpredictability and confusion for cor-
porate attorneys, their clients, and the courts."); Note, 1980 Term, supra note 100, at 273
("If the attorney-client privilege is to serve any purpose, both attorney and client must
know with certainty the limits of the privilege-something a case-by-case determination will
not accomplish."); Privileged Communications, supra note 37, at 1486-87 ("Certainty [is
believed] necessary to modify the behavior of communicators and thereby serve the sup-
posed benefits of privilege law.").
116. 449 U.S. at 396.
117. Id. at 404 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
118. Id. at 393.
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support this proposition, the Court then stated that "disparate de-
cisions illustrate its unpredictability" and cited two cases: a 1967
Oklahoma case which included the leaders of a corporate research
and development division as members of the control group, and a
1969 Pennsylvania case which excluded the research and develop-
ment division heads from the control group.119 Two cases seem
flimsy evidence on which to indict a test that had been applied
countless times over twenty years. More significantly, the Court
also failed to understand that these two decisions may well be con-
sistent. The meaningful criteria are not the labels or titles used to
designate various individuals, but those persons' actual duties and
responsibilities. 120 The "disparate decisions" may have been in fact
the correct and predictable results of applying the control group
test to the different organizational structures of different
corporations.
Moreover, many courts and commentators dispute Upjohn's
contention that the control group test is unpredictable in applica-
tion. In most cases, determining whether an individual is a mem-
ber of the senior management team is a clear cut decision. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that
the control group test "draws as bright a line as any of the pro-
posed approaches,"' 21 and one commentator concluded that the
test "provides an easily applicable bright line rule to facilitate ju-
dicial decisionmaking.' 1 22 The Illinois Supreme Court, in rejecting
Upjohn and adopting the control group test to govern Illinois law,
relied on the fact that "the control group test has been noted for
its predictability and ease of application.' 123 The Upjohn opinion's
119. Id. The Court contrasted Hogan v. Zletz, 43 F.R.D. 308, 315-16 (N.D. Okla. 1967),
aff'd in part sub nom. Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968), with Congoleum In-
dus., Inc. v. GAF Corp., 49 F.R.D. 82, 83-85 (E.D. Pa. 1969), a/I'd, 478 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir.
1973).
120. Congoleum Indus., Inc. v. GAF Corp., 49 F.R.D. 82, 85 (E.D. Pa. 1969), aft'd, 478
F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1973); Note, 1980 Term, supra note 100, at 272 n.14, 279.
121. In re Grand Jury, 599 F.2d 1224, 1235 (3d Cir. 1979).
122. Note, Control Group Test, supra note 50, at 430.
123. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 89 IMI. 2d 103, 119, 432 N.E.2d 250, 257
(1982). One might argue that Upjohn has brought certainty and ease of administration by
eliminating the second-level determination of whether the employee had control group sta-
tus. This view, however, neglects the bright line that the control group test provides. Most
communications were determined quickly to be by noncontrol group employees. If the em-
ployee was a control group member, a strong presumption held that the other prerequisites
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criticism of the control group test's "unpredictability" and "uncer-
tainty" is questionable, especially when the Court refused to set
out an alternative test.
V. TOWARD A NEW TEST
As the Supreme Court demonstrated in Upjohn, cataloguing the
shortcomings of proposed tests is relatively easy; the true challenge
is developing an attorney-corporate client privilege test that will
withstand such scrutiny. This section sets out two possible tests
and argues that either test is superior to the subject matter test
that courts have followed since Upjohn. The first proposal calls for
a return to the control group standard. Although the control group
test is, in itself, superior to the subject matter test, an unlimited
privilege for all employee communications occurring after a lawsuit
commences would further augment the control group test's advan-
tages. Under the second proposal, courts which continue to follow
the Upjohn opinion could qualify the absolute nature of the sub-
ject matter test by permitting a showing of special need to over-
come the attorney-corporate client privilege. With such a test,
courts would no longer lose the especially probative evidence that
Upjohn presently shields.
A. A Representational Privilege
The Supreme Court in Upjohn failed to undertake a comprehen-
sive examination of the costs and benefits associated with the more
expansive privilege it established. A more thorough examination
shows the merits of the control group test to be a close question
which the Court wrongly decided. The costs incurred by the
Court's voluntary compliance model are substantial. The specter of
corporations cloaking incriminating records in the privilege is a
troubling one. The often insurmountable problems posed when at-
tempting to discover information from large corporations further
were met. Today, the arena of battle has shifted to complex questions of waiver, confidenti-
ality, and scope of employment. Upjohn has led to much stricter and more time-consuming
scrutiny of background requirements. See, e.g, Mobil Oil Corp. v. Department of Energy,
102 F.R.D. 1 (N.D.N.Y. 1983) (legal advice requirement); Eglin Federal Credit Union v.
Cantor, Fitzgerald Securities Corp., 91 F.R.D. 414 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (confidentiality); see also
supra note 73 (waiver).
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warrant restricting the privilege. The Court also should have noted
the ineffectiveness of voluntary compliance as opposed to the de-
terrent effect of enforcement, and should have been more con-
cerned about the harms caused by corporate criminality. Moreover,
whether a more expansive privilege actually will lead corporations
to confide more readily in their attorneys or, rather, will induce
corporate management to use the privilege improperly as protec-
tion for business decisions surely remains open to question.124
The cost/benefit calculus tilts most strongly against an expansive
privilege when one recognizes that the privacy/rights-based ration-
ale does not apply in the corporate context.125 As a recent study of
the theories of privilege demonstrates, this privacy/rights-based ra-
tionale not only has independent force in justifying a privilege but
also plays an important role in bolstering the utilitarian justifica-
tions of a privilege. 126 The utilitarian and privacy/rights-based jus-
tifications "can be incorporated within a broad utilitarian frame-
work . . . [which] is consistent with non-utilitarian principles
because it takes account of the relative weight of the various rights
with which non-utilitarians are concerned. 1 127 This collapsing of
rationales, however, does not support the attorney-corporate client
privilege because intimacy and privacy concerns are not present in
the inanimate corporate form."' Without the support of a strong
privacy/rights-based rationale, an expansive privilege loses a key
justification under this utilitarian analysis.12 9
124. See supra notes 71-95 and accompanying text.
125. That the courts uphold a privilege which can derive no sustenance from the privacy/
rights-based rationale is ironic when scholarly literature increasingly cites that justification
as the foundation of the privilege. See supra note 36.
126. See Privileged Communications, supra note 36, at 1483-86, 1504-05.
127. Id. at 1504-05.
128. See supra notes 13-39 and accompanying text.
129. One could extend this reasoning to argue that no privilege should attach to any com-
munications between'corporate managers and attorneys, regardless of the managers' posi-
tions. This position has the virtue of logical consistency, but it seems unduly harsh. At some
level, corporate officials should be able to speak freely with their attorneys. Such communi-
cations will center less on disclosing facts to the attorney and more on planning strategy and
goals. The privilege should protect these free-wheeling discussions. In any event, the need
for some privilege in the corporate arena is a view shared widely within the legal system,
which appears unwilling to eliminate all attorney-corporate client privilege. Cf. Hazard, An
Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CALiF. L. REV. 1061, 1062 (1978)
(the present day issue "is not whether [the attorney-client privilege] should exist, but pre-
cisely what its terms should be").
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At a fundamental level, the Court in Upjohn took issue with
what it perceived to be the control group test's approach to defin-
ing the privilege-namely, an attempt to identify those corporate
actors who so personified the corporation as to be deemed the cor-
porate "client."'130 The Court maintained that by attempting to
isolate and privilege those who "can be said to possess an identity
analogous to the corporation as a whole,"'' the control group test
overlooked the very purpose of the privilege, which is to protect
certain types of communications, not people. The Court apparently
found the subject matter test better suited to ferret out those com-
munications consistent with the purposes underlying the privilege
because the test avoided the control group test's focus on which
corporate employees resemble an individual client.
The Court, however, misperceived the nature of the control
group test. The test does not seek to protect the individuals within
the control group itself, but rather seeks to encourage the type of
confidential, top-level communications that typically flow from
such personnel. 32 In this regard, it is significant to note that the
modified subject matter test presented in Diversified Industries"3
consists largely of background rules of privilege that apply even
under the control group test. The requirements of confidentiality
and a legal purpose are readily implied from Wigmore and United
Shoe.3 4 The control group test therefore possesses the same func-
tional concerns and minimal standards as the subject matter test,
but the control group test also applies a stricter requirement con-
cerning the nature of the employee's responsibilities. This further
requirement serves as a proxy, narrowing the area of protected
communications while allowing the judge to determine quickly
which among the hundreds or even thousands of documents before
130. 449 U.S. at 390 (citing City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F.
Supp. 483, 485 (E.D. Pa. 1962)).
131. Id.
132. The control group designation differs little from the role played by a marriage certif-
icate, a doctor's degree, or religious orders in validating other types of privileged communi-
cations. See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980) (marital privilege); Edington
v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 67 N.Y. 185, 194 (1876) (doctor-patient privilege).
133. 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977) (en banc), aff'd on reh'g, 572 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1978).
134. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 2292, at 554; United States v. United Shoe Ma-
chinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950).
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him are likely to involve especially valuable communications that
the privilege seeks to encourage.
The control group test prevents corporate officials from manipu-
lating the privilege to suppress embarrassing documents or cloak
nonlegal decisions in secrecy. By its restrictive nature, the control
group test inevitably sacrifices some measure of useful communica-
tion between employees and their company's lawyers. Courts might
achieve the advantages of the restrictive control group test with
less loss of useful communications by allowing the privilege to
cover any employee communications to the corporation's attorneys
that take place after the initiation of a legal action.135
Practical and theoretical considerations argue for an unlimited
attorney-corporate client privilege only when the attorney is repre-
senting the corporation in pending litigation. The practical argu-
ment is relatively simple: the corporation is less likely to manipu-
late the privilege if the communications protected are generated in
response to an existing lawsuit. One of the chief fears associated
with an expansive privilege is that the corporation will structure
normal business transactions and records through the lawyer in or-
der to benefit from the privilege." 6 Funneling documents through
a lawyer will not avail the corporation under a control group test
that expands only after legal representation has begun. The repre-
sentational privilege will not shield normal business transactions
and records because the corporation cannot "plan" an existing law-
suit. The "zone of silence" surrounding the primary events which
usually will be the source of the lawsuit thereby remains small;
only the later employee-attorney discussions about those events
earn the privilege. These latter discussions might not have oc-
curred absent the lawsuit, will be of less probative value than di-
135. Expanding the scope of the privilege upon the initiation of a suit would operate in a
manner similar to the attorney work-product doctrine. Work-product immunity applies only
when the attorney acts in anticipation of litigation. Although this proposed privilege is con-
sistent with an "anticipation of litigation" test, the "play" in such a test might prove dan-
gerous; this exception could swallow the restrictions of the control group test. "Anticipation
of litigation" has been interpreted loosely by the courts, and likely would be found to cover
any internal investigation. See, e.g., 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 32, 1
503(b)[04], at 503-56.2 nn.54 & 55. Waiting until a lawsuit is initiated is undoubtedly a
crude test, but it is a bright line which would privilege some additional communications
without completely vitiating the control group test.
136. See supra notes 47-49, 104 & 105 and accompanying text.
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rect testimony, and presumably will inform the lawyer about the
lawsuit rather than suppress unpleasant facts.
The control group test, if augmented by an unlimited represen-
tational privilege, not only prevents the suppression of valuable in-
formation but also reinforces the requirement that the privilege be
used exclusively for legal advice. The requirement that the com-
munications be for legal advice is present in the background rules
of the privilege, and is emphasized in the modified subject matter
test.1 37 Nonetheless, management officials may abuse the privilege
by using confidential information they receive from lawyers for
business decisions. If executives cannot initiate privileged commu-
nications through counsel, however, they will be less able to base
necessary business decisions on secret data collected by lawyers.
When a lawsuit is pending, communications between employees
and corporate attorneys are more to likely serve a legitimate legal
purpose. In this way, the control group test, expanded with an un-
limited representational privilege, will ensure that legal investiga-
tions are not initiated solely for nonlegal purposes.
The right to an effective defense also suggests an unlimited rep-
resentational privilege. The right to retain legal assistance is con-
stitutionally mandated in both criminal and civil actions.138 The
Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he assistance of counsel is often
a requisite to the very existence of a fair trial."13 9 This right to
counsel includes the right to a confidential relationship with one's
attorney. Uninhibited communication with employees aids the cor-
porate counsel's preparation and is an important part of this rela-
tionship. The Court stated in another context:
Counsel is provided to assist the defendant in presenting his de-
fense, but in order to do so effectively ... may require the de-
fendant to disclose embarrassing and intimate information to
his attorney. In view of the importance of uninhibited communi-
cation between a defendant and his attorney, attorney-client
communications generally are privileged.140
137. See supra notes 24 & 67.
138. See Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932);
Postashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1117-18 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 820 (1980).
139. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31 (1972).
140. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 21 (1983) (citation omitted).
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The attorney-client privilege protects the right to counsel and the
ability to present a full defense to unjust charges.14 1 Moreover, as
Professor Nesson has illustrated, the privilege plays an important
role in strengthening the legitimacy of the legal system. The privi-
lege allows litigants to test fully their opponent's case, thus en-
hancing the credibility of the eventual verdict.'42
Although the Supreme Court in Upjohn stressed a corporation's
need for legal advice in order to enable corporations to obey "the
vast and complicated array of regulatory legislation confronting
the modern corporation, '143 a corporation's right to uninhibited
communications is less compelling in the advice context. When a
corporation seeks legal advice unrelated to litigation, it is attempt-
ing to push out on its own into the gray areas of the law. The cor-
poration should bear the risks when it does so. 144 That the law is
"vast and complicated" certainly justifies a right to counsel but
not necessarily a right to the privilege. An unlimited advice privi-
lege serves to encourage marginal, possibly illegal, activity in the
gray areas by shielding these questionable decisions from scrutiny.
Such a privilege is especially undesirable because these communi-
cations occurring in the advice context between corporate manag-
ers and attorneys are likely to go to the heart of a later lawsuit. To
extend a privilege to such advice thus would shield much probative
evidence involving activities of marginal social utility.
141. See Privileged Communications, supra note 36, at 1506.
142. See Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of
Verdicts, 98 HARv. L. REv. 1357 (1985). Although the argument for a representational privi-
lege no doubt is stronger when criminal sanctions are involved, the same basic principle
should apply in the civil context. The threat of civil penalties is serious enough to merit a
full and fair defense and to warrant public acceptance of the verdict.
143. 449 U.S. at 392; see also Privileged Communications, supra note 36, at 1505-07 (lay-
men's right to know the law and abide by its complexity).
144. The Court in Upjohn seemed to take a contrary view. Justice Rehnquist appeared to
want to encourage "gray area" activity. He wrote that "[C]ompliance with the law [in the
corporate] area is hardly an instinctive matter," and pointed to the antitrust laws where
"the behavior proscribed by the [Sherman] Act is often difficult to distinguish from the gray
zone of socially acceptable and economically justifiable business conduct." 449 U.S. at 392-
93 (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 440-41 (1978)).
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B. A Qualified Privilege
This Article argues that adopting a control group test modified
by an unlimited representational privilege would enable courts to
protect only the attorney-corporate client communications most
valuable to effective legal representation and would prevent wide-
spread abuse. Courts can achieve much the same result, however,
by adopting an expansive privilege and carving out exceptions for
information which is especially probative and necessary to truth
seeking. If the Supreme Court prefers the subject matter test, the
attorney-corporate client privilege should be a qualified one which
parties may overcome by a showing of special need for the pro-
tected communications. The correct balancing of costs and benefits
necessitates that the privilege be subject to an exception that al-
lows discovery of critical communications in those rare cases where
no adequate substitute exists.
A qualified privilege would not be unprecedented. Although the
attorney-corporate client privilege always has been assumed to be
absolute, other related evidentiary privileges contain exceptions
based on substantial need.14" The attorney work-product rule, for
example, protects information gathered by an attorney in anticipa-
tion of litigation and rests, as does the attorney-corporate client
privilege, on a desire to foster effective legal advice and representa-
tion. Work-product immunity is not absolute, though. A party can
overcome the immunity "upon a showing that the party seeking
discovery has substantial need of the materials in preparation of
his case and that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain
the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means."' 14 6
145. For a more extensive discussion of this approach of arguing by analogy from other
privileges, see Privileged Communications, supra note 36, at 1491-93. "Functionalism is a
theory arguing that privilege law, if it is to be consistent, should accord similar treatment to
relations that are functionally similar." Id. at 1491.
146. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). One type of
work product, however, the "opinion work product," which consists of attorneys' mental
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories, appears to be protected absolutely
against disclosure. See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511-12; see also Upjohn Co. v. United States,
449 U.S. 383, 398-99 (1981); In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326, 336 (8th Cir. 1977); Duplan Corp.
v. Moulinage Et Retorderie De Chavanoz, 509 F.2d 730 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 997 (1975).
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This Article suggests that courts should apply a similar exception
to the attorney-corporate client privilege.
The presidential privilege presents another example of a quali-
fied judicial privilege. The Supreme Court has noted that confiden-
tiality of presidential communications deserves the greatest respect
because such confidentiality is essential to fulfilling the awesome
responsibilities of the presidency.147 In United States v. Nixon,
however, the Court held that a claim of absolute privilege for presi-
dential communications would not "prevail over the fundamental
demands of due process of law in the fair administration of crimi-
nal justice."14 Faced with a showing of specific need in a criminal
trial, the Court stated that even the presidential privilege must
give way. Other privileges running in favor of the government, such
as the informer's privilege, also have been qualified to accommo-
date defendants' due process rights.149
Courts already have developed similar exceptions for certain
specialized areas of the attorney-corporate client privilege. The
prevailing rule today in shareholder derivative suits, for example,
grants the corporation only a qualified privilege. In Garner v.
Wolfinbarger,150 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held that when stockholders sue a corporation for acting
inimically to shareholder interest, "the availability of the privilege
[should] be subject to the right of the stockholders to show cause
why it should not be invoked in a particular instance.1 151 In bal-
ancing the interests of the shareholders, the corporation, and the
general public, the court in Garner listed several indicia of "good
cause," including the discovering party's need for the evidence, the
information's availability from other sources, the claim's legitimacy
147. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974).
148. Id. at 713. The Court doubted that a narrow exception would unreasonably chill
communications: "W]e cannot conclude that advisers will be moved to temper the candor
of their remarks by the infrequent occasions of disclosure because of the possibility that
such conversations will be called for in the context of a criminal prosecution." Id. at 712.
149. See Rovario v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957). Similarly, the government fre-
quently has been precluded from relying upon the testimony of a witness whose invocation
of the privilege against self-incrimination prevented effective cross-examination. See C. Mc-
CORMICK, supra note 8, § 74.2, at 179.
150. 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971).
151. Id. at 1103-04.
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and the risk of revealing corporate trade secrets.152 The crime/
fraud exception is another instance where courts will override the
attorney-corporate client privilege in the interest of social util-
ity.153 In such cases courts will withdraw the privilege upon a
prima facie showing that the client sought the lawyer's advice or
representation for the purpose of furthering wrongful conduct.1 54
The arguments against a qualified attorney-corporate client priv-
ilege center upon the need for certainty. In order to achieve the
privilege's purpose of inducing open communication, the attorney
and client must be assured of confidentiality. 55 The goal of achiev-
ing certainty in the attorney-corporate client privilege, however,
may be little more than wishful thinking. A variety of factors un-
dermine the ideal of certainty regardless of which test courts use
for the attorney-corporate client privilege.
Few would claim, for example, that either the subject matter test
or the control group test is overly precise. The subject matter test,
even in its modified form, requires that courts decide what "the
scope of an employee's duties" includes, what "the direction of a
superior" means, and what constitutes "legal advice." The control
group test requires that courts identify those persons who "control
or take a substantial part in a decision." These tests employ some-
what amorphous criteria at best. The variety of different state law
tests for the attorney-corporate client privilege also prevents uni-
formity. Some states have maintained the control group test de-
152. Id. at 1104.
153. See, e.g., In re Doe, 551 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1977) (communication about bribery plan);
United States v. Gordon-Nikkar, 518 F.2d 972 (5th Cir. 1975) (communication about per-
jury); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146 (D.S.C. 1974) (communica-
tion about fraud against patent office).
154. See Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933). See generally Privileged Commu-
nications, supra note 36, at 1511-12.
155.
Although a more flexible approach, where the magnitude of the harm of sup-
pression might be considered in each case, would have the advantage of mini-
mizing the suppression of evidence, this needed element of certainty logically
requires a privilege against disclosure governed by a standard rule and not by
ad hoc determinations.
Note, supra note 102, at 308.
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spite the Supreme Court's opinion in Upjohn.56 Most states have
opted for a broader test, often echoing the unlimited United Shoe
protections.157 The extent of the attorney-corporate client privi-
lege, therefore, will depend largely on the jurisdiction in which the
action is brought, especially because state rules of privilege govern
federal court actions brought in diversity.158 These varying tests do
not engender certainty and confidence among large national com-
panies subject to multiple jurisdictions. Finally, corporate employ-
ees may be reluctant to reveal embarrassing or incriminating infor-
mation to the corporate attorney out of fear that the company will
decide not to assert the privilege and will elect to disclose the in-
formation. No test will provide the corporate executive in such a
situation with the "certainty" needed to guarantee free attorney-
client communication. 159 Under these circumstances, the adoption
of a qualified privilege would hardly have cataclysmic conse-
quences on the goal of "certainty."
The facts of Upjohn illustrate some of the advantages of a quali-
fied privilege. Upjohn wished to keep confidential the question-
naire responses and interview summaries of its foreign managers
and senior executives. Under a qualified privilege, the IRS would
have been required to show a "substantial need" to breach the
privilege protecting those documents. The IRS would have had dif-
ficulty making such a showing because it had ready access to the
American-based Upjohn employees. If an important Upjohn em-
ployee had died or become otherwise unavailable prior to direct
156. See, e.g, Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 89 IMI. 2d 103, 432 N.E.2d 250
(1982); Aax. R. EVID. 502(a)(2); M. R. EvID. 502(a)(2); NEv. REv. STAT. § 49.075 (1979); N.D.
R. EvID. 502(a)(2); OKLA. R. Evm. 502(a)(2); S.D. R. Evm. 502(a)(2).
157. See, e.g., Lindberg v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 525 S.W.2d 571, 572 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975);
State ex rel. Union Oil Co. v. District Court, 160 Mont. 229, 503 P.2d 1008, 1012 (1972);
Ford Motor Co. v. O.W. Burke Co., 59 Misc. 2d 543, 545, 299 N.Y.S.2d 946, 949 (Sup. Ct.
1969); see also Sexton, supra note 2, at 456 n.50.
158. See FED. R. Evm. 501; see also Krizak v. W.C. Brooks & Sons, Inc., 320 F.2d 37, 42-
43 (4th Cir. 1963); Palmer v. Fisher, 228 F.2d 603, 608 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S.
965 (1956).
159. See Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege: A Look at its Effects on the Corporate
Client and the Corporate Executive, 55 IND. L.J. 407, 408-09 (1980). "As corporate execu-
tives begin to realize that they cannot predict whether the corporation will hold their com-
munications to be privileged ... . 'the predictive certainty needed to induce disclosure by
the client ... is effectively vitiated.'" Id. at 409 n.14 (quoting Note, The Attorney-Client
Privilege and the Corporation in Shareholder Litigation, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 303, 322 (1977)).
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examination, 6 ° however, the need for his or her questionnaire re-
sponses might have warranted breaking through the privilege. Sim-
ilarly, if the IRS could have shown that questioning foreign manag-
ers was impossible or prohibitively expensive and that their
knowledge was indispensable, the Court might have overridden the
privilege. Although courts will have to decide how high a standard
of "substantial need" parties must meet, at least in extreme cases
the qualified subject matter test would allow courts to overcome
the privilege. In these rare instances of true substantial need, the
benefits of fair adjudication clearly outweigh the marginal chill on
future attorney-corporate client communications caused by over-
riding the privilege.'
VI. CONCLUSION
Upjohn has been a growth industry for lawyers.6 2 The eagerness
of corporations to avail themselves of the expansive attorney-client
privilege has made for a troubling spectacle. Contrary to the rosy
expectations expressed in Upjohn, corporations seem to be em-
ploying the privilege more to evade the law than to comply with it.
Cases abound of corporations quickly switching the handling of
embarrassing and potentially incriminating matters to lawyers for
no other apparent reason than the advantage of the secrecy pro-
vided by the attorney-corporate client privilege.6 " This Article
160. Cf. In re Grand Jury, 599 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1979) (admitting dead worker's commu-
nications on different grounds).
161. This clash between an absolute rule and a qualified standard has much deeper juris-
prudential roots. See Note, supra note 50, at 464; Privileged Communications, supra note
36, at 1486-90.
162. One explanation for the attorney-client privilege in general, and the attorney-corpo-
rate client privilege in particular, posits that attorneys and judges are safeguarding the priv-
ilege in order to gain the monopoly profit it produces. Note, 1980 Term, supra note 100, at
279 n.57; Privileged Communications, supra note 36, at 1493-98 (power theory). The
proliferation of "special counsel" in the wake of Upjohn provides a further reason for reex-
amining the scope of the attorney-corporate client privilege. See, e.g., infra note 163. Re-
gardless of whether the expanded post-Upjohn privilege caused the numerous internal in-
vestigations recently launched by corporate counsel, the effect of a broad attorney-corporate
client privilege on this phenomenon bears scrutiny. See, e.g., Special Counsel: Ticklish
Role, N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1986, at D1, col. 3; Hutton-Type Investigations, N.Y. Times, Sept.
10, 1985, at D2, col. 1.
163. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 599 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1979) (investigation by
senior management held subject to discovery, but once counsel was hired to investigate,
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questions the justifications for this phenomenon, arguing that the
utilitarian balance struck by Upjohn was incomplete and one-
sided. The control group test, particularly if augmented by an un-
limited representational privilege, better accounts for the narrower
set of benefits and the fuller range of costs associated with the at-
torney-client privilege in the corporate context. Alternatively,
Upjohn's broad subject matter test might achieve this same bal-
ance if the privilege is a qualified one, capable of being overcome
by a showing of substantial need. Although these proposed changes
in the attorney-corporate client privilege would cut back on the
lucrative opportunity that Upjohn created for lawyers, they would
enhance the goals of truth seeking and a fair legal system.
their communications with employees and their report were privileged); In re Grand Jury
Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224 (2d Cir. 1979) (investigation by corporation's Audit Committee
was not protected, but counsel's investigation was privileged); Diversified Indus., Inc. v.
Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977) ajfd on reh'g, 572 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1978) (counsel's
investigation was privileged when authorized by resolution of board of directors). See gener-
ally 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 32, % 503(b)[04], at 503-56.3 ("[Upjohn]
makes it highly advantageous to use lawyers, or paraprofessionals acting under their direc-
tion, for investigations with possible governmental regulatory impact on the corporation.");
N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1986, at D1, col. 3 (discussing widespread hiring of special counsel to
investigate corporate wrongdoing); N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1985, at D2, col. 1 (discussing spe-
cial corporate investigations).
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